The kernel of a cooperative game is a subset of the bargaining set ^d (i) . It is sensitive to symmetry relations and their generalizations, which may exist in the characteristic function. The present paper offers an interesting representation formula for the kernel. This formula is applied to deriving properties of the kernel as well as practical methods for its computation.
Introduction and general background* Let O be an ^-person cooperative game with side payments, and let it be known that its participants are trying to form a certain coalition-structure. How could or should each coalition divide its proceeds among its members? Attempting to answer this question by imposing certain stability requirements on the outcomes, R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler have introduced in [1] various bargaining sets, the most important of which is the bargaining set C (ΐ) . (This particular set is especially treated in M. Davis and M. Maschler [3] and in B. Peleg [9] .)
The study of some existence theorems for ^££ {) led M. Davis and M. Maschler [4] to construct a subset J%Γ of this bargaining set, called the kernel of the game G. Being a subset of ^£^\ each outcome in the kernel possesses the same stability properties which characterize . Moreover, it turns out that the kernel possesses many interesting mathematical properties, especially reflecting many symmetries that may exist in G. It seems that it represents a certain central portion of the bargaining set, though this aspect deserves further study. From the intuitive point of view, however, the arguments that the players will prefer outcomes in the kernel to other outcomes in the bargaining set are not too convincing (see [4] ). At most, the kernel represents a very restrictive type of negotiation. However, if the units of the payoffs represent interpersonally compared units of utility, the kernel also represents payoffs which reflect a certain balance of power among the members. (See the definition in §2.) (See also [7] , [8] .)
Being what it is, the kernel is easier to handle than the bargaining set and it is more amenable to computations. As a matter of fact, this paper has been stimulated by the results of computing the kernel for all the 4 and 5-person weighted majority games, work conducted by R. J. Aumann, B. Peleg and P. Rabinowitz [2] , Unlike other papers, in which the results were mainly obtained by a direct study of the inequalities which define the kernel and the various bargaining sets, the present paper stems from a new characterization of the kernel by a representation formula, based on separation relations induced by sets of coalitions ( §4). The separation relations are defined and studied in § 3. They lead to interesting problems of algebraic and combinatorial nature which are discussed throughout the paper. In particular, it is shown how to construct sets of coalitions which possess certain separation relations ( §8).
The representation formula describes the kernel as a finite union of closed and convex polyhedra. At first sight, the formula looks much more complicated than the original definition of the kernel; however, its great power is revealed in almost any subsequent section. For example, it yields a completely algebraic proof that for every game (and corresponding to every coalition structure) there exist payoffs in the kernel ( §5). This result has previously been proved by the use of the Brouwer fixed-point theorem (see [3] , [4] and [9] ). A by-product of the method of the proof is the quite surprising fact that the kernel always intersects the core of the game, if the core is not empty.
The study of the separation relations and the representation formula enables one to determine the maximal dimension of the kernel of an -person game ( §6). It equals precisely n -[log 2 (n -4)] -2 (where, "[ ]" means, "the integral part of"). 1 In addition to its theoretical interest, this result is important in devising a program for computing the kernel (see [2] 
§6).
There is an enormous number of polyhedra which appear in the representation formula. Experience in computation shows, however, that most of them are either empty sets or are contained in a few of them. For computation purposes, one is interested in screening out a priori those polyhedra which are superfluous. The problem is two-fold:
(1) To determine which polyhedra are superfluous for all games ( §7).
(2) To determine which polyhedra are superfluous due to the fact that the characteristic function happens to possess certain properties ( § § 10 and 11).
For example, two players in a game are called symmetric if the game remains invariant when these players exchange roles. We generalize this concept by defining a player k to be more desirable than a player I, if player k always contributes not less than player I by joining coalitions which contain none of these players. These desirability relations were studied by J. R. Isbell [6] in the case of simple games. It turns out that the payoffs in the kernel always preserve the order determined by the desirability relations. If many of them exist, one is able to reduce the representation formula quite significantly ( § 10) .
Three examples are provided in § 10, in order to illustrate how to use the theoretical results for actual computation of the kernel of a game.
A similar, but essentially different, method of reduction is presented in § 11. 2* Notation and basic definitions* We shall be concerned with an %-person cooperative game G -(N; v) , with side payments, described by the set N= {1, 2, , n} of n players and the characteristic function v -v(S), which maps the nonempty subsets of N, called coalitions, into the real numbers. v(S) will be called the value of the coalition S, and the characteristic function will be normalized by the requirement. We do not require v(S) to be super-additive, but in order to avoid trivial restrictions on the coalition structures, we shall assume (2.2) v(S) ^ 0 for each coalition S (see (2.4) ).
When such a game is being played, presumably the players partition themselves into coalitions, and each coalition formed distributes its value among its members. It is reasonable to assume that each player receives at least the amount he can get by playing as a 1-person coalition (individual rationality). Thus, an outcome of the game can be represented by an individually rational payoff configuration (i.r.p.c.) 
In [4], Davis and Maschler introduced the concept of the kernel Γ = SΓ(G) of the game G:
Let (x; &) be an i.r.p.c, and let S be an arbitrary coalition (not necessarily in &). We call ies the excess of S with respect to (x; &). It represents the amount that S can gain (lose, if e(S) < 0), if its members leave (x; &) and form their own coalition.
Consider two players k and { who belong to the same coalition in &.
Denote by J7~k Λ the set of coalitions which contain player k and do not contain player I; i.e., (2.6) ^-ktl = {S:keS,l$S,SczN} .
The maximum excess of k over I, with respect to (x; &) is defined to be (2.7) s ktl = s ktl (x) = max e(S) .
We also say that player k outweighs player I, with respect to (x, &) The set of all vectors x such that (x, ^) e 3Z~ is clearly a finite union of closed convex polyhedra. A priori these may be enormous in number, even for games with 4 or 5 players; yet experience indicates that many of the systems of inequalities defining the polyhedra have no solution. In fact, in computing kernels for many 4 and 5-person games, we never came across more than 4 polyhedra composing the kernel.
One of the objects of this work will be to characterize these polyhedra and to analyze the structure of the kernel. We shall then use the results to give algebraic existence proofs, to establish an upper bound for the dimension of the kernel and to develop techniques for computing the kernel.
To simplify the exposition, we shall focus our attention on i.r.p.c. ? s whose coalition-structure is the grand coalition N. Most results can easily be extended to other coalition structures, and the main ones will be stated without proofs. For this reason, except in Theorem 4. 6, 6.7 and 9.3a , the term payoff vector will henceforth denote an ^-dimensional nonnegative vector, the sum of whose coordinates equals v(N); i.e., a point in X(N) (see (2.4) ). Similarly, contrary to the general definition, we shall write x e J>Γ if and only if (x; N)e 3* Separation relations induced by a set of coalitions* Let 2$ be a set of coalitions whose members belong to a set N of players.
(i) We shall say that two players k and I separate each other by &, or are separated by ^, if there exist coalitions A and B in & such that keA,l$A,leB,k£B; i.e., (3.1) keAe&n *T hΛ and I e B e & n ^Ί,* .
(ii) We shall say that players k and I are inseparable by 3f, if each coalition of & either contains both players or contains none of them. In other words, (3.2) keAe& if and only if (iii) We shall say that player k separates player I out by £&, if there exists a coalition A in & such that ke A, Ig A, whereas every coalition in 3? which contains player I contains also player k; i.e., (3.3) ί GiG^ΠΛi, (3.4) leBe 3ϊ implies keB .
Clearly, any two players either separate each other or are inseparable or one separates the other out and only one of these relations holds for them for a fixed ϋ^.
The above separation concepts can be generated by a weak partial order relation k*t&l which means: every coalition in 3ϊ which contains I also contains k. With this notation, k -^l if and only if k and I are inseparable in ϋ^. The relation =& is an equivalence relation. Also, k and I separate each other if and only if they are incomparable by Ξ>^; and k > &1 if and only if k separates I out by £&.
We shall often be interested only in separation relations among players who belong to a subset T of N, (allowing, of course, for the coalitions in & to contain also members of N-T). In this connection it makes a difference if a player k who separates a player I out, for I G T, belongs or does not belong himself to T. Accordingly, (iv) We shall say that a player I in T is separated out by £^, with respect to T, if ke T and k separates I out by ϋ^.
Let ^ be a set of coalitions and let T be a subset of N; then there exists a unique partition of T,
which has the following properties:
is the set of players who are separated out by ^, with respect to T.
(ii) T lf , T u are the equivalence classes generated by the relation = 3^ on the players who are maximal in the relation >^.
We shall refer to {T u T 2 4* A representation of the kernel* Let T be a subset of N -{1, 2, , n}; we denote by ^(T) the set of coalitions which intersect T but do not contain T:
Let x be a payoff vector in a game (N; v), we shall construct a profile of x in the following way:
Denote by q x -{IV} the 1-elerηent set, whose element 27 = N is the set of all the players. Denote by δ^x) -(&(N, x) ) the vector having one component, where this component £&{N, x) consists of all the coalitions in <g%W) whose excess with respect to x is maximal.
(4.2) &(N, x) = {S :Se^(N), e(S, x) ^ e(T, x) for all Te
Denote by s^x) this maximum excess; i.e., The coalitions of &{N, x) induce the partition of the set Tl (see (3.5) ). Let q 2 = q 2 (x) = {Γί, Tl, , Tl) be the set of the equivalence classes of the players in N -Fϊ(&(N, x) , N). We continue inductively (see figure) : (3.5) ). Renumber all the equivalence classes in these partitions lexicographically in the lower indices and thus obtain the set q r+1 = q r+1 (x) = {Tϊ +1 , Γ 2 r+1 , , T;+^}. Continue this process until you arrive at g w . The set (x) . (See (4.7).) Moreover, since k has separated I out by £& (Tj, x) , it follows from (4.4) and (4.5) that s kyl = s r (x) and s lfk < s r (x) . Thus x x -0, because x e 5ΐ~.
We omit the proof of the converse statement, since it will be a direct consequence of Theorem 4.3 (see Remark 4.4).
We shall now generate "abstract" profiles which depend only on the set N of the players and not on the particular game and the particular characteristic function.
Starting from the set q λ -{N}, we shall define inductively sets #2, Qs 9 -*, Qn and vectors δ u δ 2 is not empty, at least one of the sets £^(TJ), j -1, 2, , u r , is not empty. Introduce the notation:
Each ^(Γ;), i = 1, 2, , u r , induces a partition on the set Γj (see (3.5) .) Renumber all the equivalence classes in these partitions lexicographically in the lower indices and thus obtain the set q r+1 = {T[ + \ Tζ + \ , Γ ^J. Continue with this process until you arrive at q n . The set ) an excess which is maximal for the coalitions in <if(TJ) i.e., Proof. Let α; belong to the left hand side of (4.11). Suppose that there exist players k, I such that k & I with respect to x. We shall prove by induction on r that in each q r = {Tί, Tζ, •••, T;' r } in P, r = 1, 2, , n, there exists a set Γ^ which contains both players, contrary to Lemma 4.1a. This is certainly true for r -1 since q x -{ΛΓ}. Suppose it is true for a particular r, and let A: and I belong to Tj. Both s k>ι and s i>fc are attained in coalitions of the class ^(Γ;), because ^^c^Γj) and J^, fc c ίf(T ). Consider the set ^(Γ;). If fe and i are separated by ^(Γj), then by (4.10), s^, z = s z , fc , because xe Xii&iTj), Tj). If one of the players, say player ϊ, is separated out by &(Tj) and the other is not separated out, then, by (4.10), (4.12) s ktl = Max e(S, a?) ,
()
and therefore s ΛfZ ^ s z , /ί; . Moreover, by (4.10), a?j = 0. If both players are separated out by ^(Γj), then x fc = x t -0. In all these cases k P& I with respect to x, contrary to our assumption. Thus, both k and I are inseparable by ^(Tj), and therefore belong to the same set in q r+1 . This concludes the proof.
REMARK 4.4. Note that it may well happen that x belongs to the right hand side of (4.11) and yet P is not a profile generated by x. We allow in (4.10) that x attains maximum excess (for the coalitions in (Tj)) also in coalitions outside of ^(Tj). Moreover, this maximum excess need not be equal to s r (x) (see (4.6)); i.e., it need not be the same for all the classes ^(Tj),j = 1,2, --*,u r . However, if P(x) is a profile generated by a payoff vector x and if x satisfies the conditions of Theorem 4.2 then x belongs to fϊί n Xi (&(T;. 9 
where ^(Γj, x) are defined by (4.5). Consequently, x belongs to <5Γ. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.2.
It will be most useful to combine both theorems in the following fashion: Starting with q x = {iV}, let #(&) be the set of all the = U U U n-XΊ(«r, «r) .
The above results hold with a few obvious modifications if the coalition structure is different from N. For example, Theorem 4.5 generalizes as follows: [9] .) In the first part of this section we shall prove this result using only algebraic methods. Again, only the case of the coalition structure N will be treated, but a similar proof holds in the general case. , m. Each TΓ^ is a closed convex polyhedron since it is given by a system of linear weak inequalities. 
Examining the change which results on the various excesses, we find that:
(i) the excess does not change for the coalitions which either contain both k and I or contain neither of these players.
(ii) it strictly decreases for the coalitions in J7~k tX .
(iii) it strictly increases for the coalitions in ^l, fc , but it still remains less than s^ξ 1 ) for them. Denote by ζ 1 * the new payoff vector, we observe that ζ 1 * £ X(N), 4 We are indebted to M. Rabin for the very simple algebraic proof given here. 5 See D. Gale [5] . 6 Any positive amount smaller than this one will also do.
and that the number of coalitions which have received the excess s^ξ 1 ) strictly decreased. Thus, either s^ξ 1 *) < ^(f 1 ), or s^ξ 1 *) -s^ξ 1 ) but fewer coalitions attain this excess with respect to ξ 1 * than with respect to f ) and construct X^u q t ). Clearly, X^l f <ft) is not empty, because it contains the point ξ 1 . We proceed by induction: Suppose that δ u δ 2 , , δ r _ u 1 ^ r ^ n -1, have been defined, such that they determine the first r stages of a profile and such that XΓ , r -1, since these coalitions either contain k and ϊ or contain neither of them. On the other hand, no coalition's excess in ^(q r ) increases beyond •s r (ξ r ). Consequently, the excesses of the various coalitions in &{q^), v -1, 2, , r -1, remain maximal with respect to ξ r \ Moreover, players who were separated out in the first r stages continue to receive a zero payment in ξ r *. Unlike the proof given in [4] , this proof shows directly that if the coefficients of the characteristic function are taken from any ordered field, then there exists a point in the kernel whose coordinates are in the ordered field 7 . The same method of proof can be used to obtain other properties of the kernel, as we shall presently see. We shall start with the concept of the ε-core which has been introduced by L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik 8 [12] . The 0-core is, of course, the usual core of the game. THEOREM 9 .
If the ε-core of a game is not empty, it contains a point in the kernel
Proof. Let C be the ε-core. The proof runs exactly as the proof of Theorem 5.2, except that X(N) in (5.2) The only thing that should be clarified is that the transition from ζ r to ζ r * does not take us out of the ε-core. This is indeed the case, since Sl (n rg Sl (r) ^ ε.
Theorem 5.4 is quite surprising since there is no apparent a priori connection between the core conception and the ideas involved in the kernel. One can easily construct games with nonempty core in which the kernel contains points outside the core. Other games exist, where the kernel is properly contained in the core. Observing that the bargaining set ^^( i) contains the core 10 and that the kernel is a subset of f; (?) , suggests that the "reason" that Theorem 5.4 works should be 7 An indirect proof runs as follows: The inequalities (2.8) which determine the kernel can be written as a system of linear inequalities in the variables v{B) and xι, with coefficients which are -1,0 or 1. The inequalities are connected by the words "and" and "or". By projection, we can successively eliminate the variables (see e.g., [1] ). The existence of a point in the kernel is therefore equivalent to the assertion that at least one of a set of inequalities ai>βi, '• ,a m >βm involving rational numbers is true. The fact that it is true is a consequence of any existence proof whether algebraic or not, and for any particular ordered field. This implies the existence in every ordered field. 8 Shapley and Shubik use the term "strong ε-core". 9 If one defines an ε-core for ε<0, by restricting (5.4) to the coalitions of r^( N) v the theorem is still true. 10 An obvious modification of the bargaining set contains the ε-core.
found by studying the location of the kernel in the bargaining set. Such a study, we believe, is worthwhile.
6* The maximal dimension of the kernel* Let G be an -person game. The kernel SΓ{G) is a finite union of closed and convex polyhedra:
The dimension of J3Γ{G) does not depend, of course, on the particular choice of polyhedra whose union is the kernel.
There arises the problem of determining how high the dimension can be for a given n. Accordingly, we define:
In this section we shall prove that
, and at the end of the section we shall give sharp bounds to the dimension of the kernel for coalition structures different from N.
The proof itself applies the results of Section 4, yet it is carried on through a series of lemmas, interesting for their own sake. The main result is of theoretical as well as of computational importance.
Let N -{1, 2, , n} and let S be a subset of N (which may be the empty set). We denote by χ s the characteristic vector of S; i.e., Z* = αί,Zί, •• ,ZΪ), where χf = 1 if ieS and χf = 0 if igS.
If & is a set of subsets of N, we denote generically by &* the set of the characteristic vectors of the elements of <^; i.e., DEFINITION 
Proof. For n = 1 the lemma is obvious. If n ~ 2, then ^* must contain the λ 2 = 2 vectors (1,0) and (0,1). These are linearly independent and (1,1) = (1,0) + (0,1). We continue by induction. Suppose the lemma is true for all the values n u n x < n, n > 2 and let & satisfy the conditions of the lemma. Without loss of generality, we may assume that ^ is a minimal completely separating set.
Let
We distinguish two cases:
, where | T\ denotes the number of players in T. We restrict ourselves to the players of T and form the set 3 Since ^ is a completely separating set, it follows that ϋ^ -{T} is a completely separating set. This contradicts the assumption that & is a minimal completely separating set.
We shall now prove that if aving the property that all the components of δ°r, except, perhaps, one, are the empty set, yet, as long as the corresponding q°r = {Γf, Tf, -",Tζ r } does not consist of single players, δ°r contains a nonempty component. This is done in the following fashion: Renumber the nonempty sets ϋ^Γj), r -1, 2, , n -1, j = 1, 2, , u r which appear in the δ/s lexiographically in r and j. You obtain a sequencê i,^i,. .,^i. If ^s = ^(T0, set δ°s = (0,...,0,^s,0,...,0), where ^s is located such that it corresponds to the equivalence class Γ;, s = 1,2, ••-,*, (Γ; must be an element of g s°) , and the length of the vector δ°s is equal to the number of elements in q°s. Let <5?+i, <5?+2, •• ,^Li be vectors of proper length whose components are the empty sets. Clearly, ΠrZlX^, q r ) = ΓirZlX^i, qΐ). Therefore, formula (4.14) remains true if one restricts the various sequences generating profiles to sequences whose elements are vectors which have at most one component different from the empty set. Such sequences will be called elementary sequences. DEFINITION 6.4 are linearly independent, p -1,2, •-., §, i = 2, 3, ---^p,
(ii) χ^ is woί α linear combination of the vectors which appear
Proo/. By induction. 11 n = 2 then ί = 1. Choose â nd the lemma follows from Corollary 6.3. Assume that the lemma is true for all n l9 n x < n, where n > 2 β If t -1, the lemma follows again from Corollary 6.3. We therefore assume that t Ξ> 2. Choosê If Σ?-iΣ&Cp.<(α lPl<> -« (P)1) ) = 0, then 
, v p . Consequently, also c ui -0 and therefore (i) has been proved.
In the proof of (iii) we distinguish two cases.
Case 1. p divides n. In this case, by (iii)° and (6.6),
P=l
Case 2. p does not divide n. In this case, by (iii)° and (6.6),
A somewhat lengthy but straightforward calculation shows that the right hand sides of (6.8) and (6.9) are greater than or equal to λ n -1. This completes the proof. We can now deduce the maximal dimension of the kernel. Actually, we shall first deduce a bound for the dimensions of pseudo kernels of -person games and then exhibit a game with a kernel whose dimension attains this bound.
Let (N; v) be a game where v(S) ^ 0 for each coalition S, but now we neither assume that v(i) -0 for each i nor do we require that v(S) Ξ> ^i e s v(i).
The pseudo kernel of such a game is literally defined exactly as in §2. (In particular, the payoff configurations are required to satisfy x i ^ 0, i = 1, 2, , n, and not
Xi^v(i)).
Pseudo kernels were introduced in [4], §7. They are indispensable tools for the computation of the kernel (see [2] ). Since no use is made in this paper of the fact v(i) = 0, all the results, and, in particular, the representation formula, hold also for the wider class of pseudo kernels. THEOREM 
d(n) = n-2-[log 2 (n -i)]. (See (6.3).) The same formula holds for the maximal dimension of the pseudo kernel of n-person game.
x Proof. Denote, as before, X n -2 + [Iog 2 (n -£)]. We shall first show by induction for pseudo kernels that 12 d(n) ^ n -X n . The theorem is true for n = 1, 2, 3, since in these cases the pseudo kernel always consists of a point. Assume that the inequality holds for all % < n y n > 3. Let G be an ^-person game whose pseudo kernel attains the maximal dimension. Represent the pseudo kernel J%Γ(G) as a finite union of closed and convex polyhedra of the form Π?=ί -Xi(^r, Q r ), where <5i, δ 2 , , δ n _j. is an elementary sequence generating a profile. Let C = C(δ l9 δ 2 , , δ n _i) be a fixed polyhedron having a maximal dimension;
, δ n _, is not completely sepa-rating, then at least one player, say player i, is separated out at one stage and therefore x x -0 for x e C. By the method of deletion of a player (see [4] , §7) we know that C is contained in the pseudo kernel of an (n -l)-person game; hence, by the induction hypothesis, , t. For each r, r -1, 2, , t, each point x of C must satisfy (among other inequalities) the equations e(S, x) -e(T, x), whenever S, Te &r(T r >f (see (4.10)). In addition, χr=i α< = v(ΛΓ) By Lemma 6.5, these equations contain at least X n equations which are linearly independent. Hence, d(C) ^ n -X n .
We shall now give an example of an ^-person game whose kernel has precisely the dimension n -λ Λ . For n -1,2,3, any game will do. We therefore assume n ^ 4. First, we construct for each w, n ^ 4, λ w -1 sets of coalitions £& n , u £3? n , 2 whenever A e & n , ki k = 1, 2, -, X n -1, generates a profile P(#) (see § 4) in which all the sets F r ά are empty. Consequently, by Theorem 4.2, the polyhedron (6.10) belongs to the kernel of the game. Since it is determined by λ n equations and since it is not empty (it contains the point (1/n, 1/n, , 1/n)), its dimension is at least n -X n . By the first part of the proof its dimension is at 
Outline of the proof. Let d(&) = d(&, G) = d(C)
, where C is one of the polyhedrons which appear in the representation formula. Using Lemma 6.5 and an inductive procedure similar to the first half of the proof of Theorem 6.6, one can show that the number of linearly independent equations among the equations which are needed to separate the players is at least X\\^\\ ~ 1; to these equations we have to add the m equations ^\ Bj Xι -v(B ό 
) S n -[log (|| έ%? || --J)l -m -1. An example similar to the one given in Theorem 6.6 shows that equality holds. ?• Improvements in the representation formula* If one wants to use the representation formula (4.14) for actual computation of the kernel of a game, one has to examine an enormous number of potential polyhedra, even for games involving only 4 or 5 players. In practice, however, most of these polyhedra turn out to be empty. For example, the kernels of 3-person games and constant-sum 4-person games consist of a unique point (see [4] ). There remains, therefore, the problem of deciding a priori which of the polyhedra in (4.14) are superfluous. The analysis has two aspects: (1) Can one take away polyhedra from (4.14) and still get a representation formula which is valid for all games? (2) Can one deduce information from the characteristic function of a specific class of games to determine a priori that certain polyhedra in (4.14) are superfluous for this specific class? In this section we shall study the first aspect. The second one will be treated in § 10.
None of the polyhedra in (4.14) can a priori be declared empty, because for a given sequence, δ l9 δ 2 , , d n _ u generating a profile, it is easy to construct games for which (4.11) is not empty. The simplest game with this property is (N v), where v(S) = 0 for every coalition 13 . It should be remarked that to each polyhedron which appears in (4.14) there exists a non trivial pseudo kernel for which this polyhedron is not empty 14 . We shall presently see, however, that many polyhedra can be deleted from (4.14) because they are always contained in other polyhedra. Proof. δ u δ 2 , * ,δ ro determine also the part q ro+1 of the desired profile. From here continue by the induction process described in (4.4), (4.5) etc. δ rQ+1 (x), •• ,δ Λ _ 1 (a?) is the desired continuation, since, by (4.10), and (4.13), xe Π^X^, q r ). LEMMA 
If 2$(T 3 ) and &*(T 3 ) are two sets of coalitions in , if Sr{T 3 )a^*(T 3 ), and if F{£f(T 3 ), T^dF^^T^ T d ), then
The proof follows immediately from (4.10). Combining the two lemmas we obtain the desired result: LEMMA , n -1, j = 1, 2, -, u r .
8* Minimal separating sets* We have seen in the last section that it is sufficient to consider in (4.14) sets of coalitions i^(Tj)'s which are minimal under separation out. This is a significant reduction in the representation formula. For example, if n -4, there are 2 14 -1 elements in #(#0; i.e., 16383 polyhedra that must be examined in the first stage, according to (4.14). Restricting oneself to sets which are minimal under separation out, the number of the polyhedra which need to be examined is 93. It is therefore important both for theoretical and computational purposes to find a procedure which generates the sets which are minimal under separation out. Such procedure should lend itself to computer programming, because the number of such sets increases rapidly with n. This section is a contribution in this direction. I; i.e., 16 We allow the empty set to be an element of 
. Let ££f(T) be a set of coalitions of the class Let 1= T -F{&{T), T), and let ^ be a set of subsets of I which is derived from £&(T) by restricting the coalitions of &(T) to the players in

(T). Indeed, if keT -I and k separates I out by &*(T), then keF(^r(T), T) and there exists a player k o ,k o el who has separated player k out by &(T) (see part iv of Lemma 3.1). Clearly, k 0 also separates I by £&*(T).
If (ii) is not satisfied, there exist coalitions A, B in 2$(T), AφB, such that Af)I=Bf)I.
Consider the set &r*(T) = &r(T) -{J5}; then its restriction to the players in I yields again the set Sf ι% We have seen that there exists a player k in I who separates a player I out by £%r*(T),leI; consequently, F(^f I ,I) Φ 0. This is impossible because, by the definition of I, 3f τ is separating.
We shall show that ^> is minimal separating. Indeed, every nonempty proper subset ^>** of ϋ?Ί is generated from a nonempty proper subset £^**(T) of ^(Γ) by restriction to the players of I, and, as before, we obtain F(&!**, I) Φ 0.
There remains the problem of constructing all the minimal separating collections for subsets I of T. For each such set ^> one adds the players of T -I in all possible ways to the coalitions of ϋ^j so as to leave them separated out by members of /. This is easily done, at least theoretically.
Actually, it suffices to construct all the minimal completely separating collections, i.e., collections which are minimal under the property that every two players separate each other by them (see §6). Minimal separating collections are then obtained by deleting collections which are not minimal separating 17 and adding players to the coalitions in the remaining collections in such a way that each new player and a previous player are inseparable.
The following lemma serves to construct the completely separating collections. Proof. If jg^ is completely separating collection for 7, then clearly so is ϋ^. Moreover, the first relation of (8.5) holds, because ra + 1 separates no player fe in / out by ϋ?, nor are m + 1 and k inseparable by ϋ^. Similarly, the second relation holds, because m + 1 is not separated out by ϋ^. Conversely, if & is completely separating and (8.5) holds, then player m + 1 neither separates any player k in I out by £^, nor are m + 1 and k inseparable by ϋr. Moreover, by the second relation in (8.5), player m + 1 is not separated out; hence & is completely separating.
9. Desirability relations* Two players k and I are called symmetric in a game (N; v) , if the game remains invariant when k and I exchange roles, i.e., if
This symmetry notion proved to be a useful criterion in checking the merits of various solution concepts for ^-person games; for it has been felt intuitively that any kind of a solution (or, at least, the set of solutions) should not distinguish between symmetric players.
An immediate generalization of in variance under symmetry, is invariance under a group of permutations. Another possibility would be to treat symmetric players as equal and define appropriately order relations among the players. This line will be pursued in this section. DEFINITION 9.1. A player k is said to be more desirable than a player i in a game G -(N; v) , and this is denoted by k ξ~ I, if
This definition generalizes IsbelΓs notion of replacement, ([6] p. 428). Intuitively, if fc fe ϊ, and k,l$ S, then S will prefer k to I as an additional partner. THEOREM 9.2. Desirability in a game is a reflexive and transitive relation.
Proof. Obviously & is a reflexive relation. To prove transitivity, let k & I, I fe m; we may assume k Φ m. Let S be an arbitrary coalition such that k,m£S.
Clearly Then, a dummy player I who receives a positive payment in x can be in no coalition of 3f which contains more than one player, because e(S U {I}, x) < e(S, x) (see (2.5) ). We shall show that also the 1-person coalition {1} cannot be in <3f. Indeed, v(N -{I}) ^ v(N) , because ί is a dummy player; hence, e(N -{I}, x) > e(N, x) = 0, because x t > 0. Therefore, the coalitions of £^ have a positive excess, whereas e({l}, x) = -x t < 0. We have proved that & separates such a player out. Combining this result with Theorem 4.2 we obtain: THEOREM 9.4. Dummy players always obtain a zero payment in the kernel.
Let us now say that k is strictly more desirable than I, (k s-Z), if k ξz I but not I ξz k. Clearly, ε-is a partial order, and one may ask if the kernel strictly preserves desirability, i.e., if k £-1 implies x k > x lr for xej%". Unfortunately, the answer is negative: Although we have seen that strict desirability is of little value in the kernel theory, it may be applied in other aspects of ^-person game theory. For instance, it is easy to see that the Shapley value (see [11] ) strictly preserves desirability. Another interesting application is found in the representation of weighted majority games: EXAMPLE 9.6. Let G = [q; w u w u , w n ] be a weighted majority game 19 . Clearly, w k ^ w ι implies k ξzl, and therefore, the desirability relation is complete. Focusing our attention on strict desirability we can still say that w k -w x implies k ~ I; however, it is not true, in general, that w k > w ι implies k 8-I; because the weights of G are not uniquely determined. One can only claim the following. 19 We adopt the notation used by L. S. Shapley [10] . With this notation, a coalition S is winning if and only if Σ,ίesWi^q. 20 One may hope that a simple game in which the desirability relation is complete must be a weighted majority game. A counter example to such a conjecture has been provided by R. J. Aumann: Consider an 8-person simple game, in which the winning coalitions are {1458}, {2367}, all the coalitions which result from these if one wants that 1 & 2 & fe 8 will hold, and their supersets. If this game is a weighted majority game, then the sum of the weights is greater than or equal to 2q because the game contains two disjoint 4-person winning coalitions. But the game contains also the two losing complementary coalitions, {1278} and {3456), hence the same sum is less than 2g, which obviously is impossible. particular representation of G. Then, [q; wf, wf, , wt] is the desired representation.
REMARK. It is easy to see that the homogeneous weights of constant-sum homogeneous weighted majority games (see J. von Neumann and 0. Morgenstern [13] ) strictly preserve the desirability relations.
The excess of a coalition (see (2.5) ) plays a decisive role in the kernel theory. In particular, one wants to be able to compare, if possible, excesses of various coalitions with respect to the payoff vectors of the kernel, without actually computing the kernel. To achieve this we introduce: DEFINITION 9.8. Let A and B be two coalitions in a game G. We say that A is wealthier than B in G, and denote this by A ^ B, if
and if, in addition, there exists a one-to-one mapping λ of a subcoa-
Clearly the wealth relation is reflexive and transitive. By Theorem 9.3 and (9.4) it follows that if A ^ J3, then, in spite of the fact that v(B) Ξ> v(A), for every payoff vector in the kernel of G, the total poyoff received by the players of A is not less than that received by B. In view of (2.5) and (9.3) 
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• Information on the characteristic function which simplifies the representation formula* Even with the simplification gained in § 7, the representation formula contains too many polyhedra to make a joyful task of the computation by hand of the kernel of, say, a 6-person game. In this section we shall show how knowledge of the characteristic function, and, in particular, of the desirability relations may be used to determine a priori polyhedra which need not be computed-either because they are empty or because they are contained in others. Proof. By Theorem 9.3, 3r(G) balanced by the construction, and symmetric players are balanced because they receive equal payoffs due to the fact that the payoff vectors belongs to X(N; ξz). This completes the proof. consequently, e(A x U A 2 , x) > e(A lf x), contrary to the maximality of e(A u x). This again shows that X^S^iT), T) is empty.
We shall now pass to short cuts which can be deduced from the desirability relations which may occur in a game. This is motivated by Theorem 9.9 from which it follows that if xz^T, if Ae^(T,x) and if A is wealthier than B, where B is a coalition in ^(T), then , x). (ii) Xχ(i^(T;), 27) is replaced by X Z (&(T;) , Tj) (see (10.2) ) for each r and j.
Proof. Clearly, the resulting left hand side expression of (4.14) subject to the above modifications is contained in J%Γ (see the proof of Lemma 10.1) .
To show the reverse inclusion let x e J%Γ. We shall define a profile P*(x) in a way quite similar to the profile P(x) which has been defined at the beginning of § 4:
Starting with Moreover, since 1 -3 2 ~ 3 -3 4, which implies {24} ~ {34} ^ {14} and {24} ^ {34} > {23}, it follows that a saturated &r{N) must contain either {14} or {23}, and it contains both coalitions if it contains at least two coalitions. But if £gr(N) consists of one of these coalitions, then again X 2 (^f{N), N) -0. Consequently, a saturated £2>{N) is either & x -{{14}, {23}} or ^ = {{14}, {23}, {24}, {34}}. We need not consider the second case, because ^ic^2 and F(^u N)czF(^2 i N) . (See the proof of Theorem 7.5 and the remarks which follow this example.) Thus, δ^q,) = ({{14}, {23}}). There is no need to further separate between player 2 and player 3, because 2 ~ 3. Consequently, δ 2 ~ £gr(14) has one component which consists of coalitions of the clasŝ (14). The only saturated possibility which gives rise to a nonempty polyhedron is <5 2 = (^(14)) =.({{24}, {34}}).
We conclude that JST = X t (δ lt 1234) Π X 2 (K U), which is the unique point (0,1/4, 1/4,1/2). (N),N) only for a ^(ΛΓ) which is {{13}, {24}} or {{12}, {34}} or {{12}, {13}, {24}, {34}}. The first two sets are minimal under separation out but are not saturated, whereas the last set is saturated but it is not minimal under separation out. Thus, if one restricts £&(N) to be both minimal under separation out and saturated, one will never obtain (1/4,1/4,1/4,1/4). The correct procedure would be either of the following two:
(i) For a given Tj consider all sets ^(Tj) which are minimal under separation out and delete from them nonsaturated ones provided that by adding less wealthy coalitions you reach a set which is minimal under separation out.
(ii) For a given T;, consider all the saturated sets .^(T 1 /), and delete from them sets which are not minimal under separation out provided that for each set £&*(Tj) which you delete there exists a saturated set ^**(T;) such that &r**(Tj)cz &r*(Tj) and EXAMPLE 10.6. Consider the 6-person weighted majority game [8; 5, 4, 2, 2,1,1], We shall illustrate our method by computing its kernel.
Let x e X(N; fe) (see 10.1), then, by Example 9.6, x ί^xft^x8 = % 4 έ x δ = x 6 . Obviously, (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (x) with respect to this payoff vector). Therefore, in order to apply Theorem 10.4, it is sufficient to restrict oneself to payoff vectors for which x u x 2 > 0. In other words, both players 1 and 2 must not be separated out at any stage (see (4.10), (4.13) and (4.14)).
Obviously, the maximum excess s^x) (see (4.3)) of any payoff vector must be obtained at some minimal winning coalition, and s^x) > 0. Consequently, no losing coalition is in &(N) = £&(q^. Moreover, if s^x) is obtained in a winning coalition S which is not a minimal winning coalition and if T is a minimal subcoalition of S, then the members of S -T must obtain a zero payment in x.
Since 1 and 2 are not separated out, them two possibilities may occur: (i) &r(N) contains the coalition {12} and does not intersect botĥ , 2 and ^\ Λ (see (2.6) ). By the previous remarks, and since players who are separated out receive a zero payment in X 2 (^(N) , N), it follows that x z = x, = x 5 = x 6 = 0 for xe X 2 (^r(N) , N). Consequently, s^x) == 0, which is impossible, (ii) £&(N) intersects either ^, 2 or 2,1 and therefore it intersects both sets. Examinning the minimal winning coalitions and taking into account that xeX(N; fe), we find that in order that X 2 (£gr(N) If {4} e ^({14}), then x ± = x 4 for x e X 2 (^({14}), {14}), because x x < x,, implies § 1Λ {x) > β 4ll (a;). The only payoff vector x which may perhaps result is (1/3,1/3,1/3,1/3, 2/3), which is not in X 2 (^({14}), {14}), because -1/3 = e({4}, x) < e({45}, *) = 0. Thus, ^({14}) can only be one of the ^'s, i = 5,6, , 10 . A straightforward computation shows that u N) Π Xl& t , {14}) = Xl^, N) n X 2 (^6, {14}) = [(0,1/2,1/2,1/2,1/2) (1/24,11/24, 11/24,12/24, 13/24) ] s I, , &» N) n xi& u {14})
= [ (7/24, 8/24, 8/24, 9/24, 16/24)(l/24, 11/24,11/24, 12/24,13/24 )] = I t , n x 2 (^8, {14}) = xι&ι, N) n x,{^, {14}) = 0, = [ (7/24, 8/24, 8/24, 9/24, 16/24) (11/36,11/36, 11/36, 14/36, 25/36 )] = J 3 , and therefore J%^ =• I x U / a U 1% is a union of three straight line segments.
11* Favorablness relations* If many desirability relations occur in a game, Theorem 10.4 yields a significant reduction in the representation formula. In general, however, even if a complete order of desirability of players exists, the methods described here do not filter out all the superfluous polyhedra, and we know of no general method which does. We can suggest, however, another method which may be quite powerful even if no desirability relations exist at all. This will now be explained. Proof. Clearly, if δ°r is removed, the right hand side of (4.14) is contained in J^7 To prove the other inclusion, let x be a payoff vector in JyΓ* and P*(x) be the profile constructed in the proof of 
(A) ^ v((A U {k}) -{I}) .
Such a favorableness relation will be denoted by 24 k §3 ^( T) l. Note that the "weak" player I is put here in a nonsymmetric role with respect to LEMMA 11.3. Let x be a payoff vector in a game (N; v) , and let , X) be the set of those coalitions among the coalitions of r έ? which attain maximum excess s(T,x) with respect to x. If then x k ^ χ ι% 23 And such a removal may of course reduce the sets q r +ι, 9(q r +ύ, , Qn-i, n-ύ, Qn. 24 We are only interested in the relation £z&(τ,x) *Έr^{τ,x) plays no role here.
Proof.
25 Suppose x x > x k . There exists a coalition A in £&(T, x) 9 leA,k$A, for which (11.2) holds. Clearly, (A U {k}) -{l}e <jf{T). By (11.2), e((A (J {k}) -{I}, x) -e{A, x) ^ x t -x k > 0, contrary to the maximality of β(A, cc).
REMARK 11.4. In view of the previous lemma, we extend from now on the definition of favorableness with respect to &(T) by transitive closure. Similarly, because of Theorem 9.3, and since we are only interested in payoff vectors of the kernel, we can combine the desirability and favorableness relations with respect to a &(T) and close them by transitivity. We shall refer to such an operation as a combined desirability-favorableness relation. For x e Jϊt; it follows from the desirability relations and from Theorem 9.3 that x 2 > 0. Therefore, only such ^(JV)'s need be considered, for which player 2 is not separated out.
b. For x e <βt~, # 3 + x± > 0. Indeed, otherwise, player 3 will outweigh any player who receives a positive payoff. Therefore, only such ££f{N)'& need be considered for which either player 3 or player 4 is not separated out.
In order to satisfy α. and 6., &(N) must contain at least five coalitions. A glance in the secend column of the table shows that any such set must contain coalitions {12}, {25} and {34}, which implies that all the players must be equal under the combined desirabilityfavorableness relations. Thus, all the 2-person winning coalitions must be in &{N) and (1/5,1/5,1/5, 1/5,1/5) is the unique point in the kernel.
The same ideas can further be generalized by introducing favorableness relations among sets of players. We shall state the definitions and the lemmas, but the proofs will be omitted; they resemble the proofs of Lemmas 11.3 and 11.6. 
